The study of intranation political conflict has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Various models-sometimes explicitly specified but often left implicit in the research-have been employed in attempts to explain the causes and consequences of internal instability. This paper outlines a model of conflict behavior within nations which reflects the idea that a behavior of such complexity can be understood only through a multidisciplinary approach. That is, a synthesis of a number of models is necessary to explain instability behavior or, for that matter, any other form of conflict behavior (compare Fink, 1968; Mack and Synder, 1957).
Further, the authors consider conflict from the point of view of both the strategist-who seeks to engage in conflict behavior to obtain a specified goal or set of goals-and the manager-the actor desiring to limit the scope or intensity of conflict behavior. It is important that the term &dquo;strategist&dquo; not be interpreted as being equivalent to &dquo;insurgent,&dquo; &dquo;civilian,&dquo; or &dquo;revolutionary.&dquo; Nor is &dquo;manager&dquo; a term to denote only political authority or government. At times, it may be civilian groups who attempt to manage the level of conflict, just as it may be persons of authority who seek to engage in violence. Terry Nardin (1971: 15) Leites .and Wolf, 1970 (1966) and Robert Ardrey ( 1966, 1961) regard human aggression (of which [811] political turmoil is a part) as stemming from an instinctive drive. States Lorenz (1966: x) (Lorenz, 1966: 278) . Lorenz suggests redirection of aggression into sports and other forms of activity.
FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION MODELS
In contrast to the instinctive drive view of aggression are the stimulus-response models, the most notable of which was originated by Dollard et al. (1939) . A basic postulate of their frustration-aggression model is that aggression is always the consequence of frustration. Aggression is any act &dquo;the goal response of which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed,&dquo; and frustration is an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in a behavior sequence (Dollard et al., 1939: 1-9) . Dollard et al. (1939: 1) hypothesized originally that the occurence of aggressive behavior assumes the existence of frustration and that the existence of frustration necessarily leads to some form of aggression. Misinterpretation of this sweeping statement caused Miller (1941: 338) to rephrase the latter portion of the hypothesis thusly: &dquo;Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression.&dquo; Thus, the model does not imply that frustration always leads to direct, overt aggressive behavior. Rather, the hypothesis states that when aggressive behavior does occur, it is the result of frustration (see Berkowitz, 1969 Berkowitz, : 68-69, 1965 Berkowitz, , 1962 Buss, 1961 ) .
The frustration-aggression model has been a popular framework for the study of domestic conflict. As Feierabend et al. (1969: 635-637) point out, one source of &dquo;systemic frustration&dquo; within a nation is a gap between the aspirations and expectations of individuals or groups on the one hand, and the achievements that actually occur (see Gurr, 1970 Gurr, , 1968a Gurr, , 1968b . Samuel Huntington (1968: 53-54) (1965) . Similar recognition of the frustration-aggression explanation of political instability can be found in the works of Davies (1962) , Gurr (1970) , Russett ( 1964) , and Tanter and Midlarsky ( 1967) .
One can see in the instinctive-drive and frustration-aggression models a crucial disagreement as to the cause of aggressive behavior. On the one hand, ethologists argue that aggression is a drive as innate, as natural, and as powerful as sex (Storr, 1968: 109); on the other, Dollard and like-minded theorists maintain that if frustrating stimuli are removed, aggression will not occur. Anthony Storr (1968: 109) , whose bias is evident in the following quote, voices the difference between these two perspectives.
[813] (Bandura et al., 1963) (Nieburg, 1969: 44 Boulding, 1962; Axelrod, 1970 Olson, 1968: 102-110 ).
In the area of conflict management, rational-choice considerations may be found in the work of a number of authors.
Scott (1970) , for instance, uses an explicitly economic approach in his study of insurgency. Leites and Wolf (1970) similarly employ cost-benefit analysis in a cogent discussion of rebellion and counterinsurgency. H. L. Nieburg (1969 Nieburg ( , 1963 Nieburg ( , 1962 has long argued that violence within a conflict often has a rational basis. Ted Gurr (1970: esp. 210-223) Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Davis, 1970; Rapoport, 1970 Rapoport, , 1966 Rapoport, , 1960 .
Although formal decision theory can be quite esoteric, the fundamental ideas underlying this approach are intuitively appealing. It is these basic propositions which we shall touch upon here; for a more complete introduction, the reader is advised to consult, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957) , Edwards and Tversky (1967) , Savage (1954) (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1970 Rapoport, , 1966 Rapoport, , 1960 Davis, 1970 Rapoport (1966: 206) In the theory of risky decision-making, the actor is assumed to maximize his subjectively expected utility (SEU; Edwards, 1961 Edwards, , 1955 Savage, 1954; Luce and Raiffa, 1957: 299-306) . The SEU maximization principle stems from the traditional mathematical notion of the expected value of a game of chance. The expected value of a bet is obtained simply by multiplying the value of each possible outcome, oi, by the corresponding probability of occurrence, pi, and then summing these products across all outcomes. Symbolically: [817] To give a simple example, suppose that you were offered the following bet: Roll a &dquo;fair&dquo; die; if a one or two comes up, you win $3.00; if any other number occurs, you lose $2.00. Should you take the bet? To answer this question, you must calculate the expected value of the offer to determine whether this value is favorable to you. The probability of obtaining a one or a two is, obviously, 2/6. Therefore, the probability of obtaining any other number is 1 -2/6, or 4/6. The EV (expected value) is thus computed:
The expected value of the bet is negative, a rather unattractive situation. Therefore, being the expected value maximizer you are, you refuse the bet.
Making decisions about whether and how to act in a conflict situation is obviously a more complex affair. The value of an outcome must be replaced by the notion of utility. One must determine how much utility, however measured, one attaches to various alternative outcomes. Moreover, the probabilities of the occurrence of possible events are not nearly so precisely known; they must be estimated subjectively. Thus, in the SEU model, the utilities of possible outcomes must be multiplied by subjective probabilities, and it is the resultant subjectively estimated utility which must be maximized.
To some, the notion of strict maximization is immediately (Downs, 1957 [Harsanyi, 1969: Bg: the benefit an actor receives from obtaining specified goal, g; Pg: the subjectively estimated probability that the conflict behavior will bring about Bg; 0 < Pg < 1; Aj: the costs of engaging in a conflict behavior which are due to an opponent's response, j; Pj: the subjectively estimated probability of opponent's response, j; 0 < Pj < 1;
n: the number of specified goals, g; m: the number of possible opponent's responses, j; Ci: the costs of engaging in the conflict behavior which are independent of the opponent's response; then, SEU, the subjectively expected utility of engaging in a particular conflict behavior, can be expressed thusly :
From the equation, it is evident that multiple goals, each associated with some benefit, may exist. Each goal, in turn, is associated with a subjective probability, P1, P2,..., Pn, that a specific conflict behavior will result in the realization of the goal (compare Wilson, 1961 (compare Allison, 1969; Tanter, 1972 Probability alteration over time is somewhat more complex. An initial subjectively estimated probability (or probability distribution) may be based on very sketchy information. As a conflict progresses over time, however, and as various strategic moves are attempted, additional information is generated regarding the conflict situation as a whole. The question is: How should such information be processed to allow the reevaluation of one's subjective probabilities? [826] What is required is some method of determining a new (or posterior) subjective probability, given some previous (or prior) estimate plus some new information. The optimal solution to this problem involves Bayes' theorem. Elementary probability theory defines P(D n H) as being equal to P(D H)P(H). That is, the probability that both one's information about the &dquo;true state&dquo; and one's own hypothesis about this state are true is equal to the probability of the information, given the hypothesis, multiplied by the probability that the hypothesis is true. Some algebraic manipulation leads to a basic form of Bayes' theorem: (provided that P(D) and P(H) * 0).
A somewhat contrived, although not entirely unrealistic example may be helpful in understanding how Bayes' theorem might be employed:
Two insurgent leaders are working together. One, I1 believes that if they engage in activity, A, there is a .4 chance that the government, G, will respond in a certain way. 12, however, believes that G probably will respond, and he assigns .7 to this probability. Either I1 or 12 is correct. I1 has, in the past, been quite expert at outguessing G, so the probability that he is right is set at .8. The probability that 12 is correct, then, is 1.0 -.8, or .2. The insurgents engage in activity A and, sure enough, G responds. How should 11 and 12 revise their estimates of who is right in light of this datum?
Once again, Bayes' theorem states that:
where P(D) = E P(D I H)P(H).
P(D H1 ) is the probability of the government responding, given that I1 I is correct. This probability, we know, is .4. Similarly, P(D I H2) = .7. Moreover: [827] By substitution, then:
Thus, the insurgents have become slightly less confident that I1 is correct and correspondingly less sure that 12 is wrong. This is certainly what one would expect, given the datum. This example is simplified in that it deals with point estimates of probabilities rather than with continuous probability distributions. Nevertheless, the basic logic of the process is the same in both instances (see, for example, Edwards et al., 1963 (Edwards, 1968; Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Peterson et al., 1965) .
If one is concerned with how strategists and managers should process the information generated within the context of a conflict, then Bayes' theorem is quite germane. If, on the other hand, an accurate description of information-processing is desired, then it is clear that psychological and other factors must be taken into account to explain the conservative nature of human beings. This topic we must leave for discussion elsewhere (see Edwards, 1968 Edwards (1961 Edwards ( , 1954a ).
An important development in conflict research would be to combine decision-making experiments with more explicitly social psychological investigations dealing with conflict behavior. Berkowitz (1969, 1965, 1962) Such experimentation would certainly be useful in uncovering [829] evidence about the behaioral modifications necessary to make decision theory more descriptive of conflict dynamics.
Another type of model evaluation might employ aggregate data on domestic turmoil (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Gurr, 1968b; Tanter, 1969; Markus and Nesvold, 1972 (Wedge, 1969 (Levy, 1970; Cantril, 1965 Gurr, 1970: 352-357) .
It should be apparent, however, that to a society the continued suppression of conflict is at least as dangerous as its violent manifestation. A total lack of conflict representation is as undesirable as the sole use of violent confrontation to resolve [831] conflict. For the conflict manager to prevent these extremes of the &dquo;spectrum of political options&dquo; from overwhelming the center, he must maintain the efficacy and legitimacy of those modes of political action which minimize violence and facilitate social change (Nieburg, 1969: 159-160 ). This philosophy is echoed in &dquo;The Port Huron Statement,&dquo; (Jacobs and Landau, 1966: 156) (Gurr, 1970 (Gurr, , 1968b ; Leites and Wolf, 1970; Markus and Nesvold, 1972 Experimental research, however, shows that the issue of variance preference is not at all straightforward (compare Edwards, 1954b; Royden et al., 1959; Coombs and Pruitt, 1960) . For this reason, this essay leaves the topic of variance preferences to one side.
